Why the EPR2 programme seems in trouble and how to get it back on track?

The EPR2 programme, which aims to build six new latest-generation nuclear reactors, is a key factor in achieving France's climate objectives and strengthening its energy sovereignty. However, it faces major financial, technical and organisational challenges.

These obstacles are not insurmountable. Recent analyses, such as those by the "Cour des Comptes" and the "Société Française d'Energie Nucléaire" (SFEN), offer concrete ways of rectifying the situation. Here is an overview of the problems encountered and possible solutions.

1. The explosion in costs: a recurring challenge

Budget overruns are common in nuclear projects. Here are a few notable examples:

• Total cost of the EPR2 programme : revised to 67.4 billion euros in 2023, an increase of 30% on the 51.7 billion euros initially forecast.
• Flamanville 3 : budget increased from €3.3 billion (2006) to €23.7 billion.
• Projects in the United Kingdom Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C are also experiencing significant drift.

Causes identified :

• Prolonged delays in work.
• Poor risk management.
• High financing costs.

Solutions proposées :

• Put in place stabilising financial mechanisms, such as zero-interest loans or guaranteed feed-in tariffs⁽¹⁾.
• Implementing Contracts for Difference⁽²⁾ (CFDs): this mechanism is particularly well suited to nuclear power, as it offers long-term visibility on revenues while protecting consumers against excessive prices. CFDs have already proved their effectiveness in the development of renewable energies.
• Exploiting the opportunities offered by the European green taxonomy⁽³⁾ : the inclusion of nuclear enables access to green financing at preferential rates and attracts ESG investors⁽⁴⁾.

2. Persistent uncertainty over funding

The EPR2 programme suffers from a vague financial framework:

• EDF : renationalised, the company needs to secure its investments.
• The French State and the European Commission : discussions on the terms and conditions of public support and regulatory validation are still ongoing.
• Identified risk : EDF could find itself isolated, as was the case for Hinkley Point C after the Chinese partner CGN pulled out.

Solutions proposées :

• Quickly clarify the funding mechanisms.
• Obtain a clear agreement on the distribution of risks between EDF, the State and private investors.

3. A sector weakened by years of under-investment

Reduced investment in nuclear power has weakened :

• Technical skills : lack of skilled labour, as evidenced by the welding defects at Flamanville 3.
• The supply chain : loss of specialist subcontractors.

Workforce requirements :

• 10,000 to 15,000 new hires a year between now and 2033 to meet the needs of existing nuclear power plants and complete the EPR2 programme.
• 1 in 10 French engineering graduates will have to join the sector by 2033.
• Thousands of skilled technicians and specialised workers to recruit and train (welders, boilermakers, electricians, valve makers, pipe fitters, mechanics, etc.).

Proposed solutions :

• Reinvest in training to fill the skills gap :
  • strengthening partnerships with engineering schools.
  • creation of vocational training centres dedicated to nuclear professions.
  • development of work-linked training, with a target of 1,000 work-linked trainees per year.
• Supporting the subcontractor ecosystem by promoting innovation and industrial partnerships.

4. Governance: gaps to be filled

The "Cour des Comptes" points to a lack of coordination and preparation:

• No assessment of the projected profitability of EPRs.
• Design studies deemed insufficient before the investment decision scheduled for 2026.

Proposed solution : strengthen management by establishing precise monitoring of costs, deadlines and risks, based on clear indicators.

5. International projects: a lever or a brake?

EDF is involved in several nuclear projects abroad:

• Objective : maintain the competitiveness of the French industry.
• Problem : these projects require significant financial and human resources, which could put the brakes on the EPR2 programme.

Proposed solution : optimise resources to create synergies that will bring direct added value to the national sector and take full advantage of feedback from international projects.

6. Energy context: rapid change

Nuclear power is facing increasing competition from renewable energies:

• The costs of EPR reactors remain high.
• Fluctuating electricity prices on the markets complicate financial projections.

The nuclear-renewable complementarity :

• The ability of French nuclear power stations to vary their electricity production from 30% to 100% of their rated output according to need, in just 30 minutes.
• Contribution to grid stability thanks to the inertia of the turbine-generator sets.
• Controllable generation to compensate for the intermittent nature of renewable energies.
• Reduced need for energy storage and backup fossil-fired power stations.

Proposed solutions :

• Ensure significant public support, as for renewable energies.
• Adapting strategy to the uncertainties of the European electricity market :
  • integrate EPRs into a stabilising financial framework (contracts for difference, guaranteed tariffs);
  • work with Europe to promote nuclear power as a pillar of the energy transition;
  • ensure the effective integration of nuclear power in a market where renewables are playing an increasingly important role.

Key recommendations

To ensure the success of the EPR2 programme, it is crucial to :

1. Clarify funding : establish a solid financial framework, validated by Brussels, to secure investment.
2. Strengthen the industrial sector : rebuild a fabric of skilled subcontractors and invest in training.
3. Optimising resources : prioritising the EPR2 programme while learning from international projects.
4. Improving governance : strengthening the monitoring of costs, deadlines and design studies.
5. Anticipating changes in Europe's energy mix:
   • Adapting the economic and technological models for EPRs to a rapidly changing electricity market.
   • Promote nuclear power as a complement to renewables, thanks to its ability to provide stable, low-carbon electricity.
6. Supporting European integration working with our European partners to ensure market opportunities and effective interconnection.
7. Strengthening social acceptability :
   • Implement transparent communication on costs and deadlines.
   • Involve local stakeholders from the design phase.
   • Developing local training and employment programmes.
   • Enhancing the economic impact of the region.
8. Establish a precise timetable with measurable milestones, as for example:
   • 2025 :
     • Finalisation of detailed design studies
     • Validation of the funding model by the European Commission.
     • Launch of the first major calls for tender.
   • 2026 :
     • Final investment decision.
     • Start of site preparation work.
     • Start of training programs.
   • 2027-2035 :
     • Staggered construction of the six EPR2 reactors.
     • Objective of commissioning the first EPR2 in 2035.
     • Gradual ramp-up of production capacity.

An emergency not to be overlooked

The EPR2 programme is much more than just an industrial project: it is a strategic pillar of Europe's energy independence. In a tense geopolitical context, where access to decarbonised and sovereign energy is becoming crucial, its success is imperative. The challenges are certainly considerable, but the solutions do exist. France has the skills, the experience and now a favourable European framework to bring this programme to fruition. The challenge now is to implement this strategy with rigour and determination, because Europe cannot afford to fail in this major energy transition.

(1) "The Contract For Difference (Contract For Difference or CFD) is concluded between a public authority (a Member State) and an electricity producer for a period of up to fifteen years. The two parties negotiate a tariff band within which the price of electricity can fluctuate freely". Further reading: Université Paris Dauphine,09/01/2024, « Le contrat pour différence : un dispositif phare de la réforme du marché européen de l’électricité ».

(2) « Des tarifs d’achat spécifiques sont appliqués selon la maturité de la filière concernée mais aussi selon la taille des installations et leur efficacité énergétique pour assurer leur rentabilité ». Pour aller plus loin : Connaissances des énergies, 04/09/2024, « Obligations d’achat : à quel montant sont les tarifs d’achat d’énergie renouvelable ? »sont les tarifs d’achat d’énergie renouvelable ? »

(3) "The EU's Green Taxonomy is a system for classifying economic activities in order to identify those that are environmentally sustainable, i.e. that do not exacerbate climate change. Further information: Commission européenne, 13/01/2022, « Taxonomie verte : mode d’emploi ! ».

(4) "ESG investing is about integrating social and environmental issues into existing business models and strategies, or transforming them altogether, on the basis that responsible business will produce better long-term investment results and that it is possible for companies to succeed and make a profit, while doing good in the world". To find out more: Recycle Track Systems, « ESG : Gouvernance environnementale et sociale ».  

Sources :

• Rapport de la Cour des comptes, 14/01/2025, « La filière EPR : une dynamique nouvelle, des risques persistants »

• Europe 1, 14/01/2025, « Construction de réacteurs EPR : la Cour des Comptes alerte sur le risque de nouvelles dérives »

• L’Indépendant, 14/01/2025, « Nucléaire : la France « loin d’être prête » pour construire d’autres réacteurs EPR comme celui de Flamanville, la Cour des comptes donne l’alerte »

• Reuters, 14/01/2025, « France ‘far from ready’ to build six new nuclear reactors, auditor says »

• Reuters, 14/01/2025, « UK’s Sizewell C nuclear project cost to rise to near $50 billion, FT reports »

• Financial Times, 14/01/2025, « French auditor recommends EDF delays UK Sizewell investment decision »

• Actu Environnement, 14/01/2025, « Nucléaire : la Cour des comptes émet des réserves sur la rentabilité de l’EPR de Flamanville » 

• Connaissances des énergies, 14/01/2025, « Construction de réacteurs EPR: la Cour des Comptes sceptique sur la crédibilité du programme »

• Boursorama Actu et Eco, 14/01/2025, « Projet nucléaire Sizewell C : le Royaume-Uni conteste le « chiffre spéculatif » d’un EPR à 47 milliards d’euros avec EDF »

• SFEN, 15/01/2025, « Précisions de la Sfen sur le rapport de la Cour des comptes au sujet de la filière EPR »

• Challenges, 15/01/2025, Nucléaire : comment les chantiers d’EDF à l’étranger pourraient freiner le développement du programme EPR 2 en France

• Power Magazine, 22/12/2024, « Flamanville 3 Reactor Online in France After 12-Year Delay »

• Le Figaro, 13/03/2022, « L’EPR finlandais Olkiluoto-3 enfin mis en service avec 12 ans de retard »

• Transitions et énergies, 17/03/2024, « EPR2, le quitte ou double d’EDF »

• Les Echos, 19/10/2023, « Electricité : les contrats CFD au cœur de la réforme du marché européen en cinq explications »

• France Travail, 10/03/2023, « Le nucléaire va embaucher massivement d’ici 2030 »